Defense in Depth Network Perimeter Security by Fatokun, Anuoluwapo Ope
Eastern Illinois University
The Keep
Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications
2018
Defense in Depth Network Perimeter Security
Anuoluwapo Ope Fatokun
Eastern Illinois University
This research is a product of the graduate program in Technology at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more
about the program.
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fatokun, Anuoluwapo Ope, "Defense in Depth Network Perimeter Security" (2018). Masters Theses. 3560.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/3560
The Graduate School� 
EJsrol.'I lw:-.ns lNl\'ERSITY" 
Thesis Maintenance and Reproduction Certificate 
FOR: Graduate Candidates Completing Theses in Par tial Fulfillment of the Degree 
Graduate Faculty Advisors Directing the Theses 
RE: Preservation, Reproduction, and Distribution of Thesis Research 
Preserving, reproducing, and distributing thesis research is an important part of Booth Library's responsibility to 
provide access to scholarship. In order to further this goal, Booth Library makes all graduate theses completed as 
part of a degree program at Eastern Illinois University available for personal study, research, and other not-for­
profit educational purposes. Under 17 U.S.C. § 108, the library may reproduce and distribute a copy without 
infringing on copyright; however, professional courtesy dictates that permission be requested from the author 
before doing so. 
Your signatures affirm the following: 
•The graduate candidate is the author of this thesis. 
• The graduate candidate retains the copyright and intellectual property rights associated with the original 
research, creative activity, and intellectual or artistic content of the thesis. 
• The graduate candidate certifies her/his compliance with federal copyright law (Title 17 of the U.S. Code) and 
her/his right to authorize reproduction and distribution of all copyrighted materials included in this thesis. 
•The graduate candidate in consultation with the faculty advisor grants Booth Library the nonexclusive, perpetual 
right to make copies of the thesis freely and publicly available without restriction, by means of any current or 
successive technology, including but not limited to photocopying, microfilm, digitization, or internet. 
•The graduate candidate acknowledges that by depositing her/his thesis with Booth Library, her/his work is 
available for viewing by the public and may be borrowed through the library's circulation and interlibrary loan 
departments, or accessed electronically. The graduate candidate acknowledges this policy by indicating in the 
following manner: 
v/" Yes, I wish to make accessible this thesis for viewing by the public 
___ No, I wish to quarantine the thesis temporarily and have included the Thesis Withholding Request Form 
• The graduate candidate waives the confidentiality provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) (20 U.S. C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) with respect to the contents of the thesis and with respect to 
information concerning authorship of the thesis, including name and status as a student at Eastern Illinois 
University. I have conferred with my graduate faculty advisor. My signature below indicates that I have read and 
agree with the above statements, and hereby give my permission to allow Booth Library to reproduce and 
;ignature indicates concurrence 1 
Graduate Candidate Signature blA�"'� ofUZ= � 
Printed Name --r;. 
M-Sc- � 
Graduate Degr;;P  
Faculty Adviser Signature 
l:xt\l c J VJ �l -IDY\ 
Printed Name �
e 
� 20\8 
Please submit in duplicate. 
DEFENSE IN DEPTH 
NETWORK PERIMETER 
SECURITY 
BY 
Anuoluwapo Ope Fatokun 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Master of Science in Technology 
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS 
2018 
YEAR 
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING 
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 
5 /9/1! 
DATE DATE 
$/l / 19> 
THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER DATE THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER DATE 
THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER DATE THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER DATE 
Copyright© 2018 by Anuoluwapo Ope Fatokun 
All Rights Reserved 
ii 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
Defense in depth network perimeter security has always be a topic of discussion for 
a long time as an efficient way of mitigating cyber-attacks. While there are no 100% 
mitigating method against cyber-attacks, a layered defense in depth network perimeter 
security can be used to mitigate against cyber-attacks. Research have shown a massive 
growth in cyber-crimes and there are limited number of cyber security expert to counter 
this attacks. EIU as an institution is taking up the responsibility of producing cyber security 
graduates with the new Master of Science in Cyber Security program that started in Fall 
2017. 
This research is aim at designing and developing a defense in depth network 
perimeter security that will be used for laboratory practices to learn and simulate cyber 
security activity and its mitigation. The research is complemented with the design of ten 
laboratory practices to give expertise to the students in the equipment used in the design. 
The designed topology comprises of two sites, connected via IPSec site to site VPN over 
an unsecure internet connection. A public testing webserver is placed at the DMZ which is 
to be used to invite hackers to attack the design system for the purpose of detecting, 
preventing and learning cyber-attack mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the light of all the headline-grabbing network and cyber security breaches in the last 
few years ranging from Equifax hacking to the alleged USA presidential election hacking and 
the recently announced Yahoo hacking among others. It's understandable that enterprises 
might be on high alert to prevent their own organization from being thrust into the spotlight, 
unfortunately there are no best solution to this because today's cyber criminals are just too 
persistent [l]. A multiple layered defense in depth strategy for network perimeter security can 
provide an answer to mitigate cyber security attacks. Putting a number on the cost of 
cybercrime and cyber espionage is the headline, but the dollar figure may not take in account 
the damage to the victims due to the cumulative effect of losses in cyberspace [2]. 
We operate in a real world of system misconfigurations, software bugs, disgruntled 
employees, and overloaded system administrators [3]. The increasing sophisticated nature of 
cyber-attacks on computer networks these days has rendered most of the traditional firewalls 
inefficient; even the most complex ones are insufficient for protecting attacks from general 
computer networks [4]. The defense in depth's strategy of network perimeter security helps in 
protecting network resources even if one of the security layer is compromised [3). 
In the past, IT executives have concentrated their efforts in perimeter hardening by 
carefully firewalling all points of entry on their network connected to the third parties with 
hope that if you locked down access to your network, you would automatically protect 
applications, data and resources [5]. Outsiders are not always the only bad guys, insiders 
commit the majority of computer security breaches. According to CSI/FBI 2003 survey, nearly 
80% of computer security breaches are done by insiders [6]. Defense in depth network 
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perimeter security allows to protect your network with multiple layers of security such that if 
one layer of security is compromised or hackers was able to get through it, another layers of 
security is there to further protect the network. In this research, we make use of different 
security vendor (Cisco & Palo Alto) to achieve our multiple layer defense in depth network 
perimeter security. One of the advantages of using different vendors is to provide an additional 
level of security such that an attack that could pass through a security vendor devices because 
of a known bug might not be available to pass through the other security vendor devices and 
thereby providing more security for the network. 
Justification of the Study 
The complexities of cyber-attacks are increasing every day, hackers are working 
around the clock developing hacking tools and new way of how to break into the assumed 
most secured network. Events in the last few months have proved that even the most secured 
network are still prone to cyber-attacks, recent examples include the Equifax hack [7], the 
alleged Russian Cyber hack on U.S Electoral system [8], the Yahoo account hack [9]. In fact, 
Kevin G. Coleman [10] reported a statement credited to Casteel; a manager at SCADA that 
"We would never be able to completely get ahead of cyber criminals perpetuating cyber­
attacks". Casteel statement is a call for more research and awareness in the area of cyber 
security, improve security techniques and strategies in order to combat security attacks. Yet, 
there are not enough skilled people to combat this increasing cyber-attack menace, in fact, 
according to Tripwire study (11], 75 percent of organizations lack skilled cyber security 
experts. 
Academic institutions, especially universities, are beginning to realize the urgent need 
for more research and programs in cyber security to develop and design cyber security 
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techniques and strategies to combat cyber security attacks and thereby producing cyber 
security graduates with the necessary skills to meet up the increasing challenge of cyber­
attacks. Eastern Illinois University started a Cyber Security Master's program under the School 
of Technology to meet its responsibility of producing graduates capable of fulfilling the world 
challenges in this area. This study will contribute to the Cyber Security Ms. Program by 
developing a defense in depth network perimeter security design for practical learning among 
different courses within the program. Providing laboratory training would further reinforce 
and expose students to different technologies used in most organizations [ 12]. This. study will 
implement a typical enterprise branch-headquarters defense in depth network perimeter 
security and would help the students to gain practical experience on a typical network scenario 
that they might come across after their graduation. 
Overall Aim 
This thesis will propose a defense in depth network perimeter security design for the 
new Master of Science Cyber Security at Eastern Illinois University. This study is advancing 
on previous design and works by incorporating cyber security technology such as IPSec Site 
to Site Virtual Private Network (VPN), Remote Access VPN, and Network Security Device 
High Availability. This thesis will provide the student with a real life practical experience and 
exposure they might come across after the completion of their program. 
Objectives 
1. Design a defense in depth network perimeter security architectuie with a VPN solution 
to a simulated branch site for the MSc Cyber Security Laboratory at EIU. 
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2. Develop a perimeter security architecture as a practice network scenario to learn cyber 
security technologies such as IPSec Site-to-Site VPN, Remote Access VPN, Network 
Security Device High Availability, and Network device hardening. 
3. Design and develop at least ten different laboratory guides comprising of how to use 
the designed perimeter network. Some of the laboratory guides includes packet 
filtering, NAT, HTTP Inspection etc. using cisco ASA and Palo Alto firewalls. 
4. Simulate using the developed architecture cyber security attacks. 
5. Recommend a detailed future work and development of the laboratory. 
Hypothesis 
The intent of this research is to ascertain the following: 
It is possible to: 
1. Develop a defense in depth network perimeter security that would offer a high 
resiliency to cyber-attacks within academic setting of the EIU Cyber Security 
Laboratory. 
2. Develop a defense in depth network perimeter security that would offer high availability 
for the network security devices and thereby continuously protecting against cyber­
attacks in event of failure of one of the security device. 
3. Develop and test a defense in depth network perimeter security that would offer multi­
vendor layered security and thereby providing security against cyber-attacks in event 
hackers breaks through a security vendor device. 
4. Develop, test and simulate an IPSec site-to-site VPN that offers secure communication 
over unsecured internet network. 
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5. Provide students with cyber-attacks real experience, and to teach them how to further 
improve cyber security systems based on the EIU laboratory ·experience. 
Delimitations 
This research would strictly provide a design for a defense in depth network perimeter 
security for the purpose of testing how a multilayer defense could protect against network 
attacks, and would not discuss the speed or the full implementation of the designed system. 
Also the Palo Alto used in the design (PA 200) is limited to HA lite; that is, it cannot do a 
stateful high availability. In addition, just basic security such as port security would be 
configured on the switch, and no extensive switch security would be considered. 
There is also the possibility that hackers launch sophisticated attackers that can break 
the security of designed system due to the fact that we do not have the latest IOS security 
versions and updated equipment. 
There is also possibility that no hackers will launch an attack to the designed system, 
although past experiences have demonstrated that hackers have very quickly found and attack 
our network. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Cyber Security and its Challenges 
Cyber security is the practice of protecting systems, networks, and programs from 
attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive 
information; extorting money from users; or interrupting normal business processes. 
Implementing effective cyber security measures is particularly challenging today because there 
are more devices than people, and attackers are becoming more innovative [15]. 
The twenty first century has seen a new dimension of warfare; the cyber warfare. 
Developed countries have started exploiting the vulnerabilities of cyberspace to gain supremacy 
and influence over the rivals and over countries. Projects like PRISM and Boundless 
Information and malwares like Stuxnet and Distrack have surprised the world by revealing how 
the cyberspace is being exploited by developed countries [14]. Reliance of developing countries 
on a reliable and secure cyberspace do not match with that of western world but still few of 
their critical organizations like national, military and private sector hold significant share in 
cyberspace. Mostly, these developing countries rely on the products developed by western 
world. The dependency has inherent vulnerabilities and opportunities which place their critical 
organizations vulnerable to cyber exploitation [14]. 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has been the major subject in the IT world, with the reality 
of IoT there would be more complexity as more devices than ever are expected to be 
interconnected. According to Folk et al [13], over a billion devices are expected to be 
interconnected, and with this comes unimaginable exploits, vulnerabilities, and attacks. 
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A successful cyber security approach has multiple layers of protection spread across the 
computers, networks, program, or data that one intends to keep safe. In an organization, the 
people, processes, and technology must all complement one another to create an effective 
defense from cyber-attacks [13]. 
Notable Cyber Attacks 
Bombshell hacks were revealed one after another in 2017, from an Equifax breach that 
compromised almost half the country to global ransom campaigns that cost companies millions 
of dollars. The cyber-attacks highlighted the alarming vulnerability of our personal information. 
More tools used by government hackers have become public, and it's easier than ever to 
create sophisticated ways to spread malware or ransomware or steal data from companies. 
Companies also frequently fail to patch security flaws in a timely manner (16]. Mark 
Nunnikhoven said as we do more and more of our business online, and as criminals realize the 
value of the data that organizations are protecting, we're seeing more big-name breaches, more 
high-profile breaches [ 17). 
In particular, ransomware when hackers demand money to unlock files is becoming 
more common. In 2017, Bitdefender, an antivirus software firm found out that ransomware 
payments hit $2 billion twice as much as in 2016 and it was predicted by trend micro that it will 
exceed $9 billion the following year (18]. 
Cybercriminals penetrated Equifax, one of the largest credit bureaus, in July and stole 
the personal data of 145 million people [161. It was considered among the worst breaches of all 
time because of the amount of sensitive information exposed, including Social Security 
numbers. The company only revealed the hack two months later. This attack could have an 
impact for years because the stolen data could be used for identity theft. 
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The Equifax breach raised concerns over the amount of information data brokers collect 
on consumers, which can range from public records to mailing addresses, birth dates and other 
personal details. Firms like Equifax, TransUnion and Experian sell that data to customers, such 
as banks, landlords and employers, so they can learn more about each and every one. Whether 
data brokers do enough to keep that private information secure is under scrutiny (16]. 
Cellebrite is a company that produces devices that can pull personal data from mobile 
phones to be use by the military and the government. The company fell victim to their own 
game when their external web server was hacked and 900GB of customer information and 
technical product data was taken ( 19]. 
NHS -Though not targeted specifically at the NHS, the WannaCry Ransomware most 
notably struck the UK health service, preventing workers from accessing their computers and 
delaying vital medical procedures. Fortunately, a flaw in its mechanism allowed experts to 
create a kill switch (19]. 
In June, a security researcher discovered almost 200 million voter 
records exposed online after a GOP data firm misconfigured a security setting in its Amazon 
cloud storage service. It was the latest in a string of major breaches stemming from insecure 
Amazon servers where data is stored. They are secure by default, but Chris Vickery, a 
researcher at cybersecurity firm UpGuard, regularly finds that companies set it up wrong [20]. 
Cyber Attacks Mitigating Techniques 
There are several techniques or technology that are always been deployed by the 
government, cooperate bodies and individuals in order to mitigate cyber-attacks and keep their 
network and resources safe. Some of these technologies are discussed below. 
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Virtual Private Network (VPN) Techniques 
A virtual private network, or VPN, is an encrypted connection over the lnternet from a 
device to a network. The encrypted connection helps ensure that sensitive data is safely 
transmitted. It prevents unauthorized people from eavesdropping on the traffic and allows the 
user to conduct work remotely 121). VPN technology is widely used in corporate environments 
where regional offices are connected over unsecure connection such as internet as shown in 
Figure 2.1 12111221. 
Reg1<>nal Olf1ce 
Internet VPN 
lutcrnrl 
Head-offce 
Remote I roaming users 
Figure 2. I VPN site to site and from roaming users. 
Firewall Technology 
A firewall is a network security system Lhat monitor and controls incoming and 
outgoing network traffic based on predetermined security rules [221. A firewall typically 
establishes a ban-ier between a trusted internal network and untrusted external network, such as 
the Internet l23 j. Cheswick and Bellovin (24] define a firewall as a collection of components 
or a system that is placed between two networks as shown in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, and 
possesses the following properties: 
•All traffic from inside to outside, and vice-versa, must pass through it. 
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•Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, is allowed to pass through it. 
•The firewall itself is immune to penetration. 
Traditional network firewalls prevent unauthorized access and attacks by protecting 
the points of entry into the network. 
WAN 
Figure 2. 2 Firewall location in a network. 
DMZ 
External Firewall Internal Firewall 
Figure 2. 3 The DMZ. 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) defined as a device or software application which 
monitors the network or system activities and finds if there is any malicious activity occur. 
Outstanding growth and usage of internet raises concerns about how to communicate and 
protect the digital information safely. In today's world hackers use different types of attacks for 
getting the valuable information. Many of the intrusion detection techniques, methods and 
algorithms help to detect those several attacks [25]. 
An IDS is referred as burglar alarm. For example the lock system in the house protects 
the house from theft. But if somebody breaks the lock system and tries to enter into the house, 
it is the burglar alarm that detects that the lock has been broken and alerts the owner by raising 
an alarm. [26]. Anderson [27] introduced the concept of intrusion detection in 1980. He has 
been the first showing the importance of security audit trails in the aim of detecting policy 
violation. He defined a violation of policy security as a deliberate unauthorized attempt to: -
access information - manipulate information - make a system unreliable or unusable. Debar et 
al [28] also described an intrusion-detection system as a detector that processes information 
coming from system that is to be protected. This detector uses three kinds of information: 
•Technique used to detect intrusion (for example signature database), 
• Configuration information about the current state of system, 
• Audit trail. 
The detector eliminates all unnecessary information, determines if this action can be 
considered as a symptom of an intrusion, and takes an action (send alerts for example). Several 
types of IDS technologies exist due to the variance of network configurations. Each type has 
advantages and disadvantage in detection, configuration, and cost. Mainly, there are three 
important distinct families of IDS: The types of IDPS technologies are differentiated primarily 
by the types of events that they monitor and the ways in which they are deployed [29]. 
The first family of IDSs is Host based IDS which monitors signs of intrusion in the local 
system. For analysis they use host system's logging and other information, the host based 
handler is referred to as the sensor. Other sources, from which a host-based sensor can obtain 
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data, include system logs and other logs generated by operating system processes and contents 
of objects not reflected in standard operating system audit and logging mechanisms [30]. Host 
based system trust strongly on audit trail. The information of the logs allows the intrusion 
detection system to spot subtle patterns of misuse that would not be visible at a higher level of 
abstraction (31]. As shown in Figure 2.4, the elementary principle in IDS including Network 
Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) originated from anomaly HIDS research based on 
Denning's pioneering work [32]. A host-based IDS provides much more relevant information 
than Network-based IDS. HIDS are used efficiently for analyzing the network attacks, for 
example, it can sometimes tell exactly what the attacker did, which commands he used, what 
files he opened, rather than just a vague accusation and there is an attempt to execute a 
dangerous command [33). It is less risky to configure. 
Advantages of Host based Intrusion Detection Systems: 
•Verifies success or failure of an attack 
• Monitors System Activities 
• Detects attacks that a network based IDS fail to detect 
• Near real time detection and response 
•Typically, does not require additional hardware 
• Lower entry cost. 
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He>st Based IDS 
IDS 
Server 
lnltemet: 
Figure 2. 4 Host Based IDS. 
\ 
Hosts 
,I 
The second family of IDSs is the Network based IDS systems, they collect information 
from the network itself rather than from each separate host. The NIDS audits the network 
attacks while packets moving across the network. As shown in Figure 2.5. the network sensors 
come equipped with attack signatures that are rules on what will constitute an attack and most 
network-based systems allow advanced users to define their own signatures [34]. Attack on the 
sensor is based on signature and they are from the previous attacks and the operation of the 
monitors will be transparent to the users and this is also significant [35]. The transparency of 
the monitors decreases the likelihood that an adversary will be able to locate it and nullify its 
capabilities without the efforts [31]. Network Node IDS (NNIDS) agents are deployed on every 
host within the network being protected [34]. 
Advantages of Network based Intrusion Detection Systems: 
•Lower cost of ownership 
• It is easier to deploy 
• It detect network based attacks 
• It retain evidence 
l3 
• It provides real time detection and quick response 
ITl11 .-.• 
WWW DNS 
!.erwr i.ervcr 
Figure 2. 5 A NIDS. 
The third family of IDSs is the Application based IDS (APIDS), they check the effective 
behavior and event of the protocol. The system or agent is placed between a process and group 
of servers that monitors and analyzes the application protocol between devices f34]. Intentional 
attacks are the malignant attacks carried out by disgruntled employees to cause harm to the 
organization and unintentional attack causes financial damage to the organization for example 
by deleting the important data files [34]. 
Intrusion Prevention Systems 
Many enterprise network systems and end user devices remain susceptible to a myriad 
of known attacks due to a simple failure to patch known vulnerabilities, outdated equipment 
and malware signatures, or failure to properly setup and deploy security devices. Since known 
vulnerabilities are typically well documented, anyone can download ready-made tools to attack 
unpatched systems [ 36]. 
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Newer blended threats and Advanced Persistent Threats, or APTs, use multiple old and 
new attack methods simultaneously, targeting specific data and even individuals within 
organizations. Therefore, both traditional and advanced security measures working together are 
especially important when defending networks against these new types of multifaceted and 
persistent attacks. Surveys verify the effectiveness of these new attacks, showing that in 2010, 
the average cost of a data breach reached $214 per compromised record. and averaged $7 .2 
million per data breach event, an increase of 6% over 2009 l37]. When developing a security 
strategy, organizations must plan to protect against not just current threats, but all threats, 
known and unknown. 
Intrusion prevention system (IPSs) are an amalgam of security technologies, their goal 
is to anticipate and to stop attacks [38]. Instead of analyzing the traffic logs, as an IDS which 
lies in discovering the attacks after they took place, an Intrusion Prevention System tries to 
warn and prevent against such attacks. While the systems of intrusion detection try to give the 
alert, the Intrusion Prevention Systems block the traffic rated dangerous. Over many years, the 
philosophy of the intrusions detection on the network amounted to detect as many as possible 
of attacks and possible intrusions and to consign them so that others take the necessary 
measures. On the contrary, the systems of prevention of the intrusions on the network have been 
developed in a new philosophy "taking the necessary measures to counter attacks or detectable 
intrusions with precision "[38]. In general terms, IPS are always online on the network to 
supervise the traffic and intervene actively by limiting or deleting the traffic judged hostile by 
interrupting the suspected sessions or by taking other reaction measures to an attack or an 
intrusion. An IPS functions symmetrically to the IDS; in addition to that, they analyze 
connection contexts, automatize the logs analysis and suspend the suspected connections. 
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The need to protect data and networks, and the need to stop attacks and prevent it is the 
reason that the IPS was created [39). A Firewall act like IPS, but an IPS focus on attack 
prevention at layers that most firewalls are not able to decipher, at least not yet [40). There are 
many types of IPS like inline network intrusion detection system, application-based 
firewalls/IDS, layer seven switches, network-based application IDSs, and deceptive 
applications. An IPS is typically designed to operate completely invisibly on a network. IPS 
products do not typically claim an IP address on the protected network but may respond 
directly to any traffic in a variety of ways. As mentioned before, IPS products have ability 
to implement firewall rules, but it is not a core function of IPS. Also, IPS offer deeper watching 
and monitoring capabilities into network operations like bad logons, inappropriate content and 
many other network and application layer functions [41]. An IPS prevents a large amount of 
downtime that would occur if it were not there, this is done by stopping any damage that may 
have made its way to the databases from internal or even external attacks. An IPS also makes 
it easier for the administrators to see where attacks are coming from so that they can address 
them and prevent any further attacks from that location f 42]. An IPS device must use 
inspection to perform advanced protection against new types of attacks. It performs TCP 
segment reassembly, traffic analysis, application protocol validation, and signature 
matching to identify the attack [43]. 
A Host IPS solutions (HIPS) as shown in Figure 2.6 is designed to protect critical 
systems and applications by blocking attack at the host and are considered the last line of 
defense, it can handle encrypted and unencrypted traffic equally, because it can analyze the data 
after it has been decrypted on the host [ 43 ]. 
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NIPS do not use processor and memory on computer hosts but uses its own CPU and 
memory. NIPS are a single point of failure, which is considered a disadvantage; however, this 
property also makes it simpler to maintain. However, this attribute applies to all network devices 
like routers and switches and can be overcome by implementing the network accordingly. NIPS 
can detect events scattered over the network and can react, whereas with a HIPS, only the host's 
data itself is available to make a decision. It would take too much time to report it to a central 
decision making engine and report back to block [44]. So, when we deploy both network 
and host IPS technologies they will provides the greatest level of protection for critical 
data and critical applications. Wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS) prevent 
unauthorized network access to local area networks and other information a ets by wireless 
devices [451. 
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Figure 2. 7 A NIPS. 
A Network I PS a s  sho wn in Figure 2.7, perform s in-line in spection of network traffic in 
a near-real-time manner, the in spection identifies attacks u si ng known vulnerabilities of 
commonly u sed softwa re products and protocol s, a s  well a s  k no wn attack patterns with unusual 
act ivity based on connection sequence s or traffic volume [42j. Intrusion Prevention System s 
are considered extensions o f  Intrusio n Detection Systems because both sy stem s  monitor 
net work tra ffic a nd/or sy stem activity for threats. The primary d ifference between the two 
sy stems i s  that Intrusion Prevention Sy stems are placed in-li ne and are therefore a ble to actively 
prevent/block intrusions that are detected. More spec ifically, an I PS can take such actions a s  
se nding an alarm, dropping malicious packets, resetting the connection and/or blocking traff ic 
from an offending I P  addre ss. An I PS can also correct Cyclic Redu ndancy Check (CRC) e rrors, 
de fragment packet streams, prevent T C P  sequenc ing i ssue s, and clea n u p  unwa nted tra nsport 
and network layer o ptions 1 40]. 
The de ployment of an I PS is very effect ive techni que to protect databases and networks 
from unauthorized u sers. It is u sed in ma ny organizations to keep its own data secure. An I PS 
like a ny other development, it has some limitations a nd many advantages. Combining network 
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and h ost fPS technology results in the most comprehensive and robust defensive posture. 
Implementing and deploying proa ctive fPS technologies will result in fewer successful 
attacks, more efficient u e of security resources, and l ower operating costs than sirnpl y 
deploying a single, limited technology and h oping to  avoid an attack. C ombining IPS, IDS and 
Firewall technol ogies will provide a strong de fense line t o  protect systems from any attack, for 
example firewall play as first defense line that connect t o  the se cond defense line IDS, and first 
and se cond lines conne ct t o  the third defense line IPS. Combining these three technol ogies 
will generate a great protection for any system. Generally an IPS is very useful when 
implemented in large networks [42]. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes in details the methodology deployed in carrying out the 
objectives of this research. It is explained in a way that it can be easily reproduce if the need 
arises. 
The Design Topology 
Figure 3 . 1  shows this thesis's design topology, it consist of a layered approach using 
different vendor security devices to provide a defense in depth network perimeter security 
mechanism l46]. Network perimeter security should be designed to avoid a single point of 
failure. This design topology takes into account that by deploying different vendor security 
devices, an attack that could compromise one security device from a vendor might not be able 
to compromise other security device from other vendor. According to Conklin et al [46], the 
inadequacies of one security device could be complemented by other security devices from the 
whole architecture. Conklin also advocates that network security systems architecture should 
have the following layers; 
• Routers 
• Firewall 
• Network segments referred to as perimeter security 
• IDSs 
• Encryption 
• Authentication software 
• Physical security and traffic control 
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In this research, a cisco router 28 1 1  has been used. The cisco 28 1 1  has the capacity to 
deliver secure data and great mobility. It comes with 2 integrated 10/100 fast Ethernet ports. In 
this research, the cisco router provide the following functions: 
The EIU Main Computer Gateway Router 
The EIU main campus gateway router in the design topology routes traffic into the 
designed network and processes traffic to the outside network when originated from the inside 
network. As shown in Figure 3 . 1 ,  the fast Ethernet 0/0 port is connected to an ISP that provides 
internet service for the designed lab. The interface is connected to a wireless bridge that connect 
wirelessly to the Verizon wireless hotspot for the purpose of internet access. The router fast 
Ethernet 0/0 port was configured as dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) client 
receiving IP address automatically from the Verizon wireless hotspot through the wireless 
bridge it is connected to. The IP address assigned by the Verizon hotspot is a private IP address 
in the range 192.168.1 .0/24. A Public IP address is usually required to be able to route traffic 
to the internet. Since the IP address assigned is a private address, a Network Address Translation 
technique (NAT) is needed to translate the private IP address to a public address, this also serve 
as a form of security which protect the inside network IP address from being know to the outside 
network. The Verizon hotspot device provides this translation inbuilt, which means all traffic 
from the assigned private IP address will be translated to a public IP address. The NAT 
technique used by Verizon is Port Address Translation (PAT) which translate all the private 
assigned IP addresses in the range of 192.168.1 .0/24 into a single public address to get to the 
internet. The router interface fast Ethernet 011 port was configured with the IP address 
90.0.1 .2/29, this interface connect directly to the Palo Alto firewall/IDS. 
Port Translation to the Web Server 
As shown in Figure 3.1,  a webserver is placed in the DMZ zone of the network with an 
assigned private lP address 172.16.1 .2/24. The private lP  address will not allow external users 
to access this webserver. In order for external users to be able to access the webserver, the router 
is configured to have a public address representation for the webserver such that traffic sent to 
this public IP address will be translated to the private IP address of the webserver. In order for 
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the traffic originating from the outside or internet to successfully communicate with the 
webserver, the following process would have to take place; 
1 .  The internet traffic destined to the webserver i s  first directed to the webserver's public IP 
address. 
2. This traffic is then redirected to the router fast Ethernet 0/0 interface, this is made 
possible with the concept of port forwarding which was configured in the Verizon 
hotspot by directing all internet traffic to the router fast Ethernet 0/0 192.168. 1 . 1 5 1  IP 
address as shown Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3 .  2 Port forwarding configuration on the Verizon hotspot 
When the traffic get redirected to the router fast Ethernet 0/0, the traffic is then further 
redirected to the web server. The explanation on how this is achieved will be provided as we 
proceed through the chapter. 
The Gateway Router NAT Configuration 
In order for the traffic directed to the fast Ethernet 0/0 interface of the router to be 
redirected to the webserver, Network Address Translation is configured on the router. The IP 
address 192.168. 1 . 151  on the faO/O interface is translated into the IP address 90.0.1.2 on 
interface faO/l which is directly connected to the Palo Alto firewall/IDS. 
The Palo Alto Firewall/IDS 
In the design topology, a Palo Alto 200 (PA-200) device is used as second layer of security. A 
PA-200 has the capacity to function as a firewall as well as an intrusion detection system (IDS). 
It is capable of filtering/blocking malicious website or URL and also comes with denial of 
service mitigating features. The following configurations were done on the Palo Alto firewall 
device to achieve its purpose for this research. 
Interfaces and Zone Configuration 
The Palo Alto device was configured with three different zones based on the design 
topology; the Trust Zone, the Untrusted Zone, and the DMZ Zone. The Ethernet interface 1/1 
(El/1) was configured as the Untrusted Zone which is connected to the gateway router, the 
Ethernet interface 1/2 (El/2) was configured as the trusted zone, and Ethernet interface 1/3 
(El/3) was configured as the DMZ zone. The zones segmented the network and ensures that 
traffic going to a zone does not crosses to another zone. For example, when the webserver is 
placed at the DMZ zone, it ensures that traffic destined to it does not get to the trusted zone, 
this provide security for the internal users located in the trusted zone. The following steps 
explain how to configure the zones and the interfaces. 
l .  On the Palo Alto web administration portal, click on the Network Tab 
2. Click on the zone tab on the left side pane 
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3. Click the add button to create a new zone as shown in Figure 3.3 
Interfaces .... 
Narre DMz! 
Type Layer3 
Zone Protecbon Profile r:one 
Loq Setting None 
L Enable User Ident1flcabon 
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Figure 3. 3 Creating a Zone 
4. Name it, for example, DMZ and then select type as layer 3 and then click ok 
5. Now to configure the interface, click the interface tab on the left hand side panel 
6. Click on the interface to be configure, for example Ethernet 1 1 1 ,  select the zone you 
want the interface to be associated with. 
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Figure 3. 4 Interface configuration 
7. Click on the 1Pv4 Tab 
8. Click on add to configure IP address on the interface, then click OK 
- -
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Figure 3. 5 IP address configuration on the interface 
9. Repeat the above steps to create the other zones and to configure other interfaces. 
Routing Configuration: Virtual Router 
For the Palo Alto to route traffic from one zone to the other, it needs to understand how 
to route the traffic. Static routing is implemented and three static routes were configured: one 
of the static route routes traffic to any destination on the internet using the router fa0/1 interface 
IP address as the default gateway, the second static route routes traffic to the 172.16.32.0 
network that is connected between the IDS/IPS device (Cisco ASA) and the internal router using 
ASA outside interface gig0/1 IP address as the default gateway and the third static route routes 
traffic to the 10.234.100.0/24 network using cisco ASA outside interface gigO/l as the default 
gateway. The following steps show how to configure the static routes; 
1 .  On the Palo Alto web administration portal, click on the Network Tab 
2. Click on the Virtual Router tab on the left side panel as shown in Figure 3.6 
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Figure 3. 6 Virtual Routers 
3. Click add and give it a name as shown in Figure 3.7 
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Figure 3. 7 YirtuaJ Router Configuration 
4. Click on static routes 
5. Give your static route a name and configure the static route details as shown Figure 3.8 
6. Then click ok. 
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Figure 3. 8 Static Route configuration 
Repeat all the steps above for the other static routes. 
The virtual router has been created, now we need to attach the interfaces to the virtual 
router created. 
7. Click on the interface tab on the left hand side of the panel and then click on an interface 
to edit i t  to attach it to the created virtual router as shown in Figure 3.9. 
Interface "ame t'l:l 1 
lnteJface Type La�er3 
Ne:flow Profile None 
Comment 
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Figure 3 .  9 Attaching an interface to a Virtual Router 
NAT Configuration and Security Policies 
The Palo Alto was configured with a bidirectional NAT to translate the webserver fP 
address 172.16.1.2 to the IP address on the untrusted zone which is 90.0. l . 1  when traffic is 
originating or returning from the webserver. Traffic from the internet destined to the web erver 
will first be translated to the gateway router interface faO/O which is 192.168. 1 . 1 5 1  which also 
has been configured to redirect the traffic to the Palo Alto untrusted interface which is 90.0. 1 . 1  
and then it i s  port forwarded to the webserver. 
Security policies was configured to allow or deny traffic between the zones. The 
following are the security policies configured as shown in Figure 3.10 
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The Palo Alto was also configured to mitigate against denial of service attack. The detail 
configuration steps is as follows; 
1 .  On the Palo Alto web administration portal, click on the Object tab 
2. Click the DoS protection tab 
3. Click add 
4. Name the DoS protection profile 
5. Check the aggregate button to select it 
6. Under the flood protection tab, check the buttons for SYN flood, UDP flood, ICMP 
flood and other IP flood tabs. 
7. Click on resource protection tab and check the session button, then click OK. 
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Figure 3. 1 1  DoS Protection configuration 
Webserver Configuration 
The webserver used for this research is hosted on a virtual machine running on Kali 
Linux Operating System. The system hosting the virtual machine is a core i7 Intel processor, 
with 8GB RAM and 1 TB hard disk size with a windows server 2012 R2 Operating System. The 
webserver is configured with an IP address 172. 16.1 .2/24 and a vulnerable web application is 
installed on the webserver, it is the content of this webserver that loads whenever a request is 
made to the public webserver IP address. 
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Cisco ASA Firewall Configuration and the Internal Router 
The Cisco ASA firewall/JPS is a cisco 5512-x device that has an IPS sensor that comes 
with over 6000 signatures in its database. It is configured to allow traffic to flow from the inside 
and to the outside network while it is configured to block all other traffic. The interfaces has 
been configured to segment traffic flow. 
Interface gig0/1 is connected to the Palo Alto and is configured as outside with a security 
level of 0, this means that traffic coming from this interface will not be trusted. Interface gig0/3 
is connected to the internal router and is configured as inside with a security level of 100, this 
means traffic from this interface will be trusted. The ASA is configured to allow VPN traffic 
from the remote site to the Internal LAN network and also traffic from the inside network is 
allowed by default to go out to the internet. 
The internal router is also a Cisco 28 1 1  router just like the gateway router. The internal 
router serves as the gateway between the internal users and the outside network. It also serve as 
a point of security, filtering traffic be default and only configured traffic is allowed to cross the 
router interface network segment. 
The EIU Satellite Campus Gateway Router and the Firewall/IDS 
As shown in Figure 3 . 12, the EIU satellite campus gateway router is a Cisco 28 1 1  router 
and is configured similarly to the EIU main campus gateway router. The interface fast Ethernet 
010 is connected to the wireless bridge and get an IP address through a dynamic host 
configuration protocol. The interface fast Ethernet 011 is connected directly to a Palo Alto 
firewall which also serves as an intrusion detection system. The interface fa0/1 is configured 
with an IP address of 80.0.1 .2/29. Network address translation is also configured on it to allow 
the inside network to be able to reach the internet. 
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Figure 3. 12 EIU Satellite Campus Champaign 
The EIU satellite campus firewall/IDS used is Palo Alto 200 same used in the EIU Main 
campus site as shown in Figure 3 . 12. Interface eth l/ l  is configured as the untrusted zone while 
interface eth 112 is configured as the trusted zone. Security policies such as allowing traffic to 
pass through from the trusted zone to the untrusted zone was also configured just like how it 
was configured on the EIU main campus Palo Alto as shown in the design topology. 
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Virtual Private Network 
As shown in the design topology, the main campus network is connected to the satellite 
campus network via IPSec Site to Site VPN. The VPN is terminated on the gateway routers on 
each sites. On each of the gateway routers, IPSec phase 1 is configured which defined the 
isakmp policies such as the authentication method which is a pre-share authentication method, 
hash algorithm, symmetric algorithm and the diffie hellman group. Then the pre-share key is 
defined and also the traffic to be protected is also defined which is the traffic from the main 
campus internal LAN network to the satellite campus internal LAN network and vice versa. 
Then IPSec phase 2 is configured which defined the IPSec policies such as the 
encryption method, the tunnel mode. ESP encryption method is used while the default tunnel 
mode is used. The IPSec is applied to the interface connected to the ISP which is interface faO/O 
on both routers. Traffic from the main campus LAN network going to the satellite campus LAN 
network is being protected and vice versa traffic from the satellite campus network traffic to the 
main campus LAN network. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
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This research has been able to achieve a major milestone in developing a laboratory for 
the Cyber Security program at EIU based on the available resources at the disposal as at the time 
of implementing this research. The research was able to simulate two sites connected over IPSec 
site to site VPN over the internet. The design has its own internet connection and makes it 
isolated from the ElU network. Internal LAN users are able to access the intemet and can 
communicate with each other. 
Results and Discussion 
A major milestone in this research was that two simulated sites with real commercial 
equipment and a true internet connection were built and would serve as a test ground to launch 
cyber-attacks to each other. It will also serve to with tand attacks from the outsider or at least in 
the future record attacks to learn hacker's behavior. The sites can communicate to the internet 
and can also access each other through an lPsec site to site VPN. One of the vision of the cyber 
security program is to have a laboratory with two simulated sites which can be used to simulate 
cyber-attacks to each other for learning. This research has accomplished having this two sites 
implemented within the available resources. While this research could not go further with 
simulating cybcr-attacks between each sites, connectivity between each sites was implemented 
and tested and it is hoped that further research in this project will dwell on this. Figure 4.1 and 
Figure 4.2 show the results of internal LAN users in EIU Main campus site and EIU Satellite 
Campus Champaign pinging www.google.com respectively proving that the internal users can 
access the external network on both sites. 
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Figure 4. 1 EIU Main Campus Internal LAN User (10.234. 100.50/24) ping www.google.com 
Figure 4. 2 EIU Satellite Campus Champaign lntemal LAN User ( 10.234.200.50/24) ping 
www.google.com 
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The Figure 4.3 shows EIU Internal LAN users accessing the webserver through the 
private address of the webserver ( 172.16.1 .2). 
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Figure 4. 3 EIU Main Campus Internal User accessing the Webserver through Private IP address 
172. 1 6 . 1 .2 
The public IP address given by the ISP is 166.1 65.203 . 1 5 1 .  External users from the 
internet who want to access the webserver will be able to acces the webserver through this IP 
address (166.1 65.203 . 1 5 1). As explained in chapter 3, this IP address will be redirected to the 
private IP address of the webserver in the DMZ zone. Figure 4.4 shows a successful web access 
from the internet to the webserver in the DMZ zone. 
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Figure 4. 4 lntemet User access the webserver through the public IP address 166.165.203. 151  
To test the VPN connectivity between the two sites, internal users in both sites will send 
pings to each other to test connectivity. The Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 shows successful ping 
connectivity between the two internal LAN users. 
41  
Figure 4 .  5 EIU Main Campus Internal LAN User (10.234.100.50) pinging EIU Satellite Campus 
Internal LAN user 1 0.234.200.50. 
42 
Figure 4. 6 EIU Satellite Campus Internal LAN User ( 10.234.200.50) pinging EIU Main Campus 
Internal LAN user 10.234.100.50. 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this research is to develop a design topology that can be used for 
laboratory practices for the cyber security program at EIU. The research fulfill this purpose by 
building two remote sites which can be used to simulate cyber-attacks. Also the publicly access 
webserver would also serve to invite hackers to hack into and serve to teach students the various 
hackers bypass security firewall. Inside users can also use the webserver to test internal hacking. 
The design developed would be a practical complement to the cyber security theoretical 
knowledge studied in the class. 
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Recommendation 
In line with the primary focus of this designed topology, it is recommended that future 
work on this research should focus more on cyber-attacks simulations of the design topology 
between the two sites and also from the external source such as hackers from the internet. It is 
also my recommendation that licenses of the security devices should be updated to aid the cyber­
attack simulation. Modification can be done on the designed topology to further advance the 
design and implementation. 
More importantly, I strongly recommend a complimentary virtual environment to simulate 
the designed topology and other laboratory practices for the cyber security practical learning. In 
the course of the research and within the available resources at the disposal of the department, I 
recommend GNS3 emulator software. Further research can be carried out on how this can be 
deploy but it is realistically possible to implement without any issue of software image with cisco 
or Palo Alto. 
The following technology objectives could not be achieve as a result of the available 
resources; 
Network Device High Available: The license on the Cisco ASA would be need to be 
upgrade to security plus to achieve this. With the GNS3 emulator this can be easily 
achieve. 
Remote Access VPN: The software version of the device used for the gateway router could 
not accommodate the client VPN image due to low flash space. This can be upgraded or 
a mode advanced router could be use. 
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Appendix A - Definition of Terms 
Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity is the practice of protecting systems, networks and programs from 
digital attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing, or destroying 
sensitive information, extorting money from users, or interrupting normal business 
processes. 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): A DMZ; sometimes referred to as a perimeter network is a physical 
or logical subnetwork that contains and exposes an organization's external facing services 
to an unsecure untrusted large network such as internet. 
Firewall: Is a network device hardware, software, or a combination thereof whose purpose is to 
enforce a security policy across its connections by allowing or denying traffic to pass into 
or out of the network. 
lntrusion Detection System (IDS): An intrusion detection system is a system that detects malicious 
activity on a computer or network. It only detect and not prevent malicious activity. 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): An intrusion prevention system monitor network traffic for 
malicious activities and when it detect a malicious activity it blocks it based on the 
configuration. 
Local Area Network (LAN): A local area network is a group of computers and associated devices 
that connect together within a close proximity to each other. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN): A VPN is a technology that creates an encrypted connection over 
an unsecure network. 
Appendix B - Configuration of EIU Main Gateway Router 
EIU_Main_Campus#sh run 
Building configuration ... 
Current configuration : 2015 bytes 
! 
! Last configuration change at 19:36:34 UTC Fri Mar 9 2018 
version 15 . 1  
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
I 
hostname EIU_Main_Campus 
I 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
I 
no aaa new-model 
dotl 1 syslog 
ip source-route 
! 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
crypto pki token default removal timeout 0 
! 
license udi pid CISC0281 1  sn FfX1040A2FO 
! 
redundancy 
! 
ip ftp usemame ben 
ip ftp password password 
! 
crypto isakmp policy 10  
encr aes 
hash md5 
authentication pre-share 
group 2 
crypto isakmp key cisco address 192.168.1 .2 1 1  
I 
crypto ipsec transfonn-set MYTHES IS esp-aes esp-sha-hmac 
I 
crypto map MYMAP 10 ipsec-isakmp 
5 1  
set peer 192.168. 1 .2 1 1  
set transform-set MYTHESIS 
match address VPN 
interface FastEthemetO/O 
ip address dhcp 
ip nat outside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
crypto map MYMAP 
' 
interface FastEthemetO/l 
! 
ip address 90.0.1.2 255.255.255.248 
ip nat inside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
interface FastEthemet0/0/0 
no ip address 
! 
interface F astEthemet0/0/1 
no ip address 
! 
interface F astEthemet0/012 
no ip address 
! 
interface F astEthemet0/0/3 
no ip address 
! 
interface Vlanl 
no ip address 
! 
ip forward-protocol nd 
no ip http server 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
ip nat inside source list 105 interface FastEthemetO/O overload 
ip nat inside source static tcp 90.0. 1 . 1 80 192.168 . 1 . 15 1  80 extendable 
ip route 10.144.1.0 255.255.255.248 90.0. 1 . 1  
ip route 10.234.100.0 255.255.255.0 90.0. 1 . 1  
ip route 10.234.200.0 255.255.255.0 192.168. 1 .2 1 1  
ip route 172. 16.32.0 255.255.255.248 90.0. l .  l 
! 
ip access-list extended VPN 
52 
• 
permit ip 10.234. 100.0 0.0.0.255 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 
' 
access-list 105 deny ip 1 0.234.100.0 0.0.0.255 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list 105 permit ip any any 
! 
control-plane 
' 
line con 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
login 
transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1 000 
end 
53 
ASA-FW-IPS# sh run 
: Saved 
ASA Version 9. 1 (2) 
! 
Appendix C - Configuration of Cisco ASA Firewall 
hostname ASA-FW-IPS 
enable password E.bgA9kfttKB/.vi encrypted 
names 
interface GigabitEthernetO/O 
shutdown 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
nameif Outside 
security-level 0 
ip address 10.144. 1 . 1  255.255.255.248 
' 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
! 
shutdown 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
interface GigabitEthernet0/3 
nameif Inside 
security-level 100 
ip address 172.16.32.2 255.255.255.248 
interface GigabitEthernet0/4 
shutdown 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/5 
shutdown 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
! 
interface ManagementO/O 
54 
I 
management-only 
shutdown 
no nameif 
no security-level 
no ip address 
ftp mode passive 
SS 
access-list OUT-IN extended permit ip 10.234.200.0 255.255.255.0 10.234. 100.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list OUT-IN extended permit ip 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.234. 100.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list OUT-IN extended permit icmp 90.0.1.0 255.255.25S.248 any 
access-list OUT-IN extended permit icmp 172.16.1.0 255.2S5.2SS.O any 
pager lines 24 
mtu Outside lSOO 
mtu Inside 1500 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
no arp permit-nonconnected 
access-group OUT-IN in interface Outside 
route Outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.144.1.2 1 
route Inside 10.234. 100.0 2S5.25S.2S5.0 172.16.32.1 1 
route Outside 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.144.1.2 1 
timeout xlate 3:00:00 
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30 
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 
timeout sunrpc 0: 10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1 :00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00 
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01 :00 
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00 
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicy 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
no snmp-server location 
no sump-server contact 
sump-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart warmstart 
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite 
crypto ca trustpool policy 
telnet timeout S 
ssh timeout 5 
ssh key-exchange group dh-groupl-shal 
console timeout 0 
threat-detection basic-threat 
threat-detection statistics access-list 
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept 
! 
class-map inspection_default 
match default-inspection-traffic 
I 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map 
parameters 
message-length maximum client auto 
message-length maximum 512 
policy-map global_policy 
class inspection_default 
inspect dns preset_dns_map 
inspect ftp 
! 
inspect h323 h225 
inspect h323 ras 
inspect rsh 
inspect rtsp 
inspect esmtp 
inspect sqlnet 
inspect skinny 
inspect sunrpc 
inspect xdmcp 
inspect sip 
inspect netbios 
inspect tftp 
inspect ip-options 
inspect http 
service-policy global_policy global 
prompt hostname context 
call-home reporting anonymous prompt 2 
Cryptochecksum:954e4ed0d555296be604bb44f4f0012d 
: end 
56 
Internal-Router#sh run 
Building configuration ... 
Appendix D - Configuration of Internal Router 
Current configuration : 1404 bytes 
! 
version 15. l 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname Internal-Router 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
no aaa new-model 
dotl 1 syslog 
ip source-route 
! 
ip cef 
! 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
! 
crypto pki token default removal timeout 0 
! 
license udi pid CISC0281 1 sn FTX1040A2ET 
username cisco password 0 cisco 
! 
redundancy 
! 
interface FastEthernetO/O 
description Outside lnteface 
I 
ip address 172.16.32.1 255.255.255.248 
ip nat outside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
interface FastEthemet0/1 
description Inside Interface 
ip address 10.234.100.1 255.255.255.0 
ip nat inside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
57 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
! 
interface F astEthernet0/0/0 
no ip address 
I 
interface FastEthernet0/0/1 
no ip address 
! 
interface F astEthernet0/0/2 
no ip address 
! 
interface F astEthemet0/0/3 
no ip address 
I 
interface Vlanl 
no ip address 
I 
ip forward-protocol nd 
ip http server 
ip http authentication local 
no ip http secure-server 
! 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 172.16.32.2 
ip route 10.144.1.0 255.255.255.248 172.16.32.2 
ip route 90.0. 1.0 255.255.255.248 172.16.32.2 
ip route 172.16.1.0 255.255.255.248 172.16.32.2 
! 
control-plane 
! 
line con 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
login 
transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
end 
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Appendix E - Configuration of EIU Satellite Campus Gateway Router 
Champaign_GatewayRouter#sh run 
Building configuration ... 
Current configuration: 3609 bytes 
! 
version 15.1  
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 
no service password-encryption 
! 
hostname Champaigne_ GatewayRouter 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
enable password cisco 
I 
no aaa new-model 
dotl 1 syslog 
ip source-route 
I 
ip cef 
I 
multilink bundle-name authenticated 
crypto pki token default removal timeout 0 
! 
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-213188813 
enrollment selfsigned 
subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-213188813 
revocation-check none 
rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2 13 188813 
! 
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-213188813 
certificate self-signed 01 
30820229 30820192 A0030201 02020101 30000609 2A864886 F7000101 05050030 
303 l2E30 2C060355 0403 1325 494F5320 53656C66 20536967 6E65642D 43657274 
69666963 61746520 323 13331 38383831 33301E17 00313631 30303832 3 1 323132 
365Al70D 32303031 303 1 3030 30303030 5A30303 1 2E302C06 03550403 1325494F 
53205365 6C662053 69676E65 64204365 72746966 69636174 65203231 33313838 
3831 3330 819F300D 06092A86 4886F70D 01010105 00038180 00308189 02818100 
AE903C81 OOB7570A BAF9C235 9208006E OC0055A7 42639BOO OEDE2A33 
A7D235FC 
59 
60 
OECC8431 C69847Bl FA05960A EOEBEOO l 80C17C74 2846C61 4  2C807B16 69B58A05 
5B02EECE 6E2BE599 6E1 5AF65 OOB8A3F6 867CF508 F6B33CAB 70240155 04FAAA97 
07A68032 4COC18B2 735FA9FO C6C935A7 35C1202E 1981FB2E 70B47533 1C001365 
02030100 01A35330 5 1 300F06 03551013 0101FF04 05300301 0 1 FF301F 0603551 0  
23041830 1680147E 2012F70C 40E3A977 904E3BB5 C408C040 3 1048F30 10060355 
1 00E04 16 04147E20 12F70C40 E3A97790 4E3BB5C4 08C04031 048F3000 06092A86 
4886F700 01010505 00038181  0042220E AD017AB1 32B4A3AO 13208F38 05ACF250 
AD9E2380 7FCD606F 037A97EA 44A6E416 12B4BOB6 18016C75 B5588299 68096AE9 
9B45AADO 2A77C885 954F60Al 04A32B90 4302C617 297E0254 EC804450 F593 1B36 
37071 lFB E024C01 1 01CE9421 8E04BA22 07990253 EC508EC6 7E537C1 B  EE78F609 
202FCC58 B04E6CEO 9E8548A4 24 
quit 
license udi pid CISC0281 1 sn FrX1040A2F3 
username cisco privilege 15 password 0 cisco 
! 
redundancy 
! 
crypto isakmp policy 10  
set peer 192.168.1 . 151  
set transform-set MYTHESIS 
match address VPN 
interface FastEthernetO/O 
ip address dhcp 
ip nat outside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
crypto map MYMAP 
I 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
ip address 80.0. 1.2 255.255.255.248 
ip nat inside 
ip virtual-reassembly in 
duplex auto 
speed auto 
I 
interface F astEthernet0/0/0 
no ip address 
! 
interface F astEthernetO/O/ 1 
no ip address 
I 
interface F astEthernet0/0/2 
no ip address 
interface F astEthemet0/0/3 
no ip address 
! 
interface Vlanl 
no ip address 
' 
ip forward-protocol nd 
ip http server 
ip http authentication local 
ip http secure-server 
' 
ip nat inside source list NAT interface FastEthemetO/O overload 
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168. 1 . 1  
ip route 10.234.100.0 255.255.255.0 192.168 . 1 . 151  
ip  route 10.234.200.0 255.255.255.0 80.0. 1 . 1  
ip access-list exten9ed NAT 
deny ip 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 10.234. 100.0 0.0.0.255 
permit ip 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 any 
ip access-list extended VPN 
permit ip 10.234.200.0 0.0.0.255 10.234.100.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
no cdp run 
' 
control-plane 
! 
line con 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
privilege level 1 5  
password cisco 
login local 
transport input telnet ssh 
line vty 5 1 5  · 
password cisco 
login local 
transport input all 
! 
scheduler allocate 20000 1000 
end 
6 1  
Appendix F - Laboratory Guidelines 
NETWORK SECURITY 
LABORATORY I: BUILDING THE NETWORK 
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Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab exerci e is to introduce students to different network security 
devices by having access to the network device and configuring the network device ip addresses. 
Configuring the IP addresses of the network devices will expose students to some basic command 
line and erve a a start to their introduction to different network security devices. 
Assumption: It is assumed that students have some basic knowledge in networking. 
Task: 
The network topology below has been physically connected, configure and assign ip addresses to 
interfaces of the network devices. 
E><ternal Attacker 
Pub/le Fodng W('b Svr 
Internal Router 
INTERNAL LAN ZONE 0.23 .100.0/24 
I 
AOSvr 
iiil _=::r,, Internal User Internal Attacker 
Solution Guide 
legitimate & Remote 
Access User 
EIU Satellt<t Campus 
Champal1ne Fa&� 
-- - - Gate" y Router Fa0/1 so.o.;� 2 _119 _ ., _ _ _ _ _ _ 
,, '  Eth l/l --, /fWZone ' I \ Palo Alto 1 
, IOS/FW / ' -- - - iEthl/2 _ _ _ , " /  - -
-
-
-
-
Satellte Campus User 
Or. Melton 
NOTE: You need to connect a management computer to the console of the router to have access 
to the command line interface of the router. 
EIU Main Campus Gateway Router 
EIU _Main_ Campus>enable 
EIU _Main_ Campus#Conf t 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config)#int faO/O 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config-it)#ip address dhcp 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config-if)#no hutdown 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config)#ex it 
EIU_Main_Campus(config)#int fa0/1 
EIU_Main_Campus(config-it)#ip address 90.0. 1.2 255.255.255.248 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config-it)#no shutdown 
Palo Alto 
You will need to connect physically to the management port of the Palo Alto and 
configure your system IP address as follow: 
Your System IP address: 192.168. 1 .2 and subnet mask of 255.255.255.0 
Then go lo https://192.168.1.1 on your browser to access Palo Alto Web Portal. 
Usemame/Password is admin/admin 
The web page will appear as this: 
Configure the interface as shown below. 
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Cisco ASA 
ASA-FW-IPS#conf t 
ASA-FW-IPS(config)#int gig0/1 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#nameif Outside 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#security-level 0 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#ip address 10.144. 1 . 1  255.255.255.248 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#no shutdown 
ASA-FW-IPS( config-if)#exit 
ASA-FW-IPS(config)#int gig0/3 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#nameif Inside 
ASA-FW-IPS( config-if)#security-level 100 
ASA-FW-IPS( config-if)#ip address 172.16.32.2 255.255.255.248 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#no shutdown 
ASA-FW-IPS(config-if)#exit 
Internal Router 
lnternal-Router>enable 
lnternal-Router#conf t 
Internal-Router(config)#int faO/O 
� .. 
� 
.... _ 
� 
� 
Intemal-Router(config-if)#ip address 172.16.32.1 255.255.255.248 
Intemal-Router(config-if)#no shutdown 
Internal-Router( config-if)#exit 
lntemal-Router(config)#int faO/l 
Internal-Router(config-if)#ip address 10.234. 100. l 255.255.255.0 
Intemal-Router(config-if)#no shutdown 
lntemal-Router(config-if)#exit 
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Champaigne Gateway Router 
Champaigne_ GatewayRouter>enable 
Champaigne_GatewayRouter#conf t 
Champaigne_ Gatewa yRouter( config)#int faO/O 
Champaigne_GatewayRouter(config-it)#ip address dhcp 
Champaigne_ Gatewa yRouter( config-if)#no shutdown 
Champaigne_ Gatewa yRouter( config-if)#ex it 
Champaigne_ Gatewa yRouter( config)#int faO/ 1 
Champaigne_ GatewayRouter( config-if)#ip address 80.0. 1.2 255.255.255.248 
Champaigne_ GatewayRouter( config-if)#no shutdown 
Champaigne_ GatewayRouter( config-if)#exit 
Champaigne_ Gatewa yRouter( config)# 
Champaigne Palo Alto 
Follow same procedure above to configure champaigne palo alto 
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NETWORK SECURI'I Y 
LABORATORY II: NAT: ACCESSING THE INTERNET 
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Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab exercise is to introduce students to NAT; Network Address 
Translation. NAT allow multiple private 1p address users to access the internet with a single shared 
public ip address. We will also be introduce to static NAT. by statically NATting the private ip 
address of the web server to our public ip address can be able to access the webserver with the 
public ip address. 
Assumption: It is assumed that students have some basic knowledge in networking. 
Task: 
The network topology below has been physically connected, configure NAT on the EIU Main 
campus gateway router so that internal Ian zone can access the internet and users from the internet 
can access the web server using the public ip address of int faO/O. 
·----
Public Facing Web Svr 
INTERNAL LAN ZONE 
A 
External Attacker legitimate & Remote 
Access User 
EIU Sat.Ute Campus 
EIU Main Campus 
Gateway Router "°IO-�-,&- ---- . - - -- - - - -i�--Ch•m�lcne _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • t:.>.ec;.5ite Ia.Site _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Gate v Router 
Fa0/1 90.0.1.0/29 80.0.1.0/29 
E 1/1 - - · 1 - - - -
, , -
- -.t:h l/1 - - -...... 
"FW Zon ' 
GI '/1 
'511 Cisco Asa � IOS/IPS/FW 
GI /3 
1n. 6.32.0129 
Intern al Router 
.100.0/24 
I \ Palo Ako , 
\ IOS/FW / 
... / 
- - - - - -
r�� - - - - -
Satellte Campus US« 
Dr. Melton I 
ADSvr 
-
Internal User Internal Attacker 
EIU Main Campus�!!E:-lf 
Gateway Router 
DMZ ZONE 
Eth1/3 
172.1 .1.0/24 
-
- - - - - - - - -
Palo Alto 
05/IPSFW 
/2 
Public Facing Web Svr 10.14 .1.0/29 
Solution Guide 
EIU Main Campus Gateway Router 
Create Access-list for the permitted traffic 
EIU _Main_ Campus>enable 
EIU _Main_ Campus#Conf t 
EIU_Main_Campus(config)# access-list 105 permit ip any any 
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The above access-list is permitting all traffic from the internal network to any network on 
the internet. 
Configure the NAT 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config-it)#int faO/O 
EIU_Main_Campus(config-if)#ip nat outside 
EIU _Main_ Campus( config-if)#exit 
Boundary_Router(config)#int faO/l 
Boundary_Router(config-if)#ip nat inside 
Boundary _Router( config-if)#ex it 
Boundary_Router(config)# ip nat inside source list 105 interface FastEthernetO/O 
overload 
NAT Overloading or Port Addre�s Translation ( PAT) is a modified form of 
dynamic NAT where the number of inside local addresses is greater than the number of 
inside global addresses. Mostly, there is just a single inside global IP address providing 
Internet access to all in ide hosts. 
.!C-JS 
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Now configure Static NAT for internet users to be able to access the web server with EIU 
Main Gateway router public facing interface ip address. 
Boundary _Router( con fig)# ip nat inside source static tcp 90.0. 1 .  l 80 192.168. 1 . 1  S l 80 
extendable 
Here the router is configured to NAT to the Palo Alto Outside interface (90.0. 1 . 1 )  which 
is then configure to do static NA Tting to the web server which is 172.16. l .2. 
Configure the static NAT on Palo Alto to the web server 
rf'*!i..d� rift 
dtl!:'y;V �-�'ll'\! 
l'ab.'a'� 
I taiic.,:n ib<-
.,. 
Name Address 
DMZ 172. 16. 1 .0/24 
DMZ_Transla. . .  90 .0. 1. 1/32 
LAN_NeLVVork 10. 234. 100. 0/24 
pub web ser . . .  172. 16. 1. 2 
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ASA FIREWALL 
LAB 1 :  AUTO NAT AND MANUAL NAT 
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab is to learn how to configure Network Address Translation 
in ASA firewall .  As we have learnt in previous lab how to configure it in a cisco router, we are 
going to learn how it is configured in ASA firewall. 
Configure the basic IP addressing for the CISCO ASA interfaces. 
Lab-1: Auto NAT and Manual NAT 
111111111 INSIDE ASA OUTSIDE OIMlt 
PC PC 
• VI.Alli Cl VLAll 2 a 11.1.1.llJA t011 eM1 20l 111.20Ul27 
-.2 -., l -., -.30 ==:11 
VI.M l  
112.111.1 
.1 
DMZ •1 
.. .._ .  -
a) Connect the rollover console cable to the ASA con ole port (i.e. USB to Serial) 
b) Check the "Computer management" in your PC and then check "device manager" (PORT 
COM&LPT) and for the available serial port (i.e. COM 7" or other) 
c) Using PUITY (Double click) in your desktop, click on serial and change the appropriate 
COM port in step a) , use 9600 bits/sec as default connection speed) , then click "open" 
d) Press enter and program the ASA as follows 
Ciscoasa>enable (NO password , just press enter) 
Ciscoasa#config t 
Ciscoasa( config)#int gigO/ 1 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#no shutdown 
Ciscoasa( config-if)#nameif inside 
Ciscoasa( config-rl)#security-level 100 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ip address 10. 1 . 1 . 1  255.255.255.0 
Ciscoasa( config-if)#ex it 
Ciscoasa( config)#int gigO/O 
Ciscoasa( config-if)#no shutdown 
Ciscoasa( config-if)#nameif outside 
Ciscoasa( config-if)#security-level 0 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ip address 209 . 1 65.200.l 255.255.255 224 
Ciscoasa( config-it)#exit 
Ciscoasa( config)#int gig0/2 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#no shutdown 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#nameif dmz 
Ciscoasa( config-if)#security-level 50 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#ip address 192. 1 68. 1 . l  255.255.255.0 
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e) By default the echo-reply ICMP is not allowed from a lower security to a higher security, 
enabling lCMP inspection in the policy-map global_policy: 
Ciscoasa( config)# policy-map global_policy 
Ciscoasa( config-pmap )# class inspection_default 
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)# inspect icmp 
f) Auto-NAT Configuration: The following procedure is one of the way to program NAT 
and is configure under object network 
Task l :  The DMZ server requires a static translation when routed to the outside interface. The 
translated ip address is 209 . 165.200.22: 
Ciscoasa(config)# object network DMZ-SRY 
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# host 192. 1 68. 1 . 10 
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# nat (dmz, outside) static 209.165.200.22 
g) Access the public server from the DMZ computer/server ( 192.168.1 .10) by typing 
htp:/1209.1 65.200.30 (Ask the GA to start the Web-server service on the public 
webserver 1209 . 1 65.200.30] and on the DMZ webserver ( 1 92 . 1 68 . 1 . 10) 
h) check the translation after activity g) by typing (config) # show xlate 
From the Dl\1Z Server connect to the Public Ser\'er: 
o e a 
OUTSIDE web Server 
WELCOME! 
Task2: The in ide network requires PAT when routed to the outside interface, the ho ts in the 
inside network share the same public IP address 209.165.200.20: 
Ciscoasa(config)# object network INSIDE-NETWORK 
Ciscoasa( config-network-object)# subnet l 0. 1 . 1 .0 255.255.255.0 
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# nat (inside, outside) dynamic 209. 165.200.20 
i) Testing the translations: The show xlate command shown that the inside host with 
10. 1 . 1 .2 is translated to 209. 165.200.20 
ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMMING. 
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Manually programming NA TIP AT, is recommended when you have to include a policy at which 
at which it should translate when it's going to a particular destination. 
To Begin; Clear previous configuration 
Ciscoasa(config)# clear configure object 
Manual Configuration 
For The DMZ server, configure a translation that should be used only when the destination is the 
outside network is 209.165.200.0/27 using the translated Ip addres 209. 1 65.200.25: 
Cicoasa( config)#object network DMZ-SRV 
Ciscoasa( config)# host 192. 168. 1 . 1 0  
Ciscoasa( config)#ex it 
Ciscoasa(config)# object network OUTSIDE-NETWORK 
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)# subnet 209. 165.200.0 255.255.25.224 
Ciscoasa( config-network-object )#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-MANUAL-NAT 
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#host 209. 165.200.25 
Ciscoasa( config-network-object)#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#nat (dmz,outside) source static DMZ-SRV DMZ-MANUAL-NAT destination 
static OUTSIDE-NETWORK OUTSIDE-NETWORK 
Do show xlate 
Task3: For inside clients, configure a translation that should be used when accessing the DMZ 
server on TCP port 8080, the inside hosts should use a single IP address 192.168. 1 . 1 1 and the 
dmz server should see the port 80 instead of 8080: 
Ciscoasa( config)#object network INSIDE-NETWORK 
Ciscoasa(config)#subnet 10. 1 . 1 .0 255.255.255.0 
Ciscoasa( config)#exit 
Ciscoasa( config)#object net work DMZ_P AT 
Ciscoasa( config-network-object)#host 192.168. 1 . 1 1  
Ciscoasa(config-network-object)#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#object service HTTP _80 
Ciscoasa(config-service-object)#service tcp destination eq www 
Cisco as a( config-service-ob ject)#ex it 
Ciscoasa(config)#object service HTTP _PROXY _PORT 
Ciscoa a(config-service-object)#service tcp destination eq 8080 
Ciscoasa(config)#nat (inside,DMZ) source dynamic INSIDE-NETWORK DMZ_PAT 
destination tatic DMZ-SRV DMZ-SRV service HTTP _PROXY _PORT HTTP _80 
From inside host, we can access the web server in dmz usin htt :// 192 . 168. 1 . 10:8080 
Jcome to XAMPP for Windows 7. 
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LAB 2: HTIP INSPECTION 
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab i lo learn the default behavior of how an ASA firewall 
inspect http traffic and to configure it. 
...... ASA OUTSIDE OUllfdl 
PC PC 
· 2 
VLAN 1  
Cl 
VLAN 2  a 101.1.0l24 eOl1 eOIO 20l.11UOO.Ol27 .1 .1 .30 , . 
·--·� ---· 
VLAH 3  
112.111.1 . 
. 1 
DMZ m �, Server • 
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Task l :  By default ASA does not allow a traffic to traverse from a lower security level to a 
higher security level. We should configure an access list OUT-TO-DMZ that permits HTTP 
traffic from the outside server to the internal IP address of the DMZ server. Apply the access list 
to the ASA outside interface in the "IN" direction. 
Solution: 
Ciscoasa>enable 
Ciscoasa#conf t 
To Begin with, clear all previous configurations 
Ci coasa(config)#clear configure nat 
Ciscoasa( config)#clear configure object 
Then Start Configuration 
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SERVER-PRIV 
Ciscoasa( config)#host 192.168. 1 .  l 0 
Ciscoasa( config)#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#access-list OUT-TO-DMZ extended permit tcp host 209.165.200.30 object 
DMZ-SERVER-PRIV eq www 
Ciscoasa(config)#access-group OUT-TO-DMZ in interface outside 
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Another method that can be used to allow http traffic from lower security level to higher 
security is when the traffic initially originated from a higher security level, the return traffic of 
such traffic will be allow in from a lower security level to a higher security level. 
Task 2: Without using access-list, configure the ASA to allow inbound return traffic of http from 
a lower security level to a higher security level. In other words we will inspect if the traffic has 
been originated in the inside or not and then allow it if originated from the inside. 
Solution 
We are going to make use of modular policy framework (MPF) and by default the ASA does not 
inspect http traffic so we need to enable it. 
Modular Policy Framework (MPF) configuration defines set of rules for applying fuewall 
features. such as traffic inspecLion, QoS etc. to the traffic Lransiting the firewall. 
Ciscoasa>enable 
Ciscoasa#config t 
Ciscoasa( config)#pol icy-map global_pol icy 
Ciscoasa( config-pmap )#class inspection_ default 
Ciscoasa( config-pmap-c)#inspect http 
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)#exit 
Ciscoasa( coiifig-pmap )#exit 
Ciscoasa( config)# 
What we have done is to inspect all http traffic that originate from inside, this will create a 
session table and all return traffic of that traffic will allow in from lower security level to a 
higher security level. 
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Task 3: We are also going to use http inspection to drop all  bad http traffic from coming into the 
network. Bad traffic in this case are traffic that uses http port number other than the web traffic, 
for example telnet traffic trying to use port 80 instead of port 23. 
Configure HTTP inspection between any host from outside and the dmz server to verify 
conformance to the http protocol. 
Solution: 
Create a NAT to allow the DMZ server to be accessed from the outside network 
Create an http inspection policy-map named HTTP-Policy 
Enable the HTTP protocol verification to drop and log all HTTP sessions that do not 
conform to the standard protocol specifications. 
Ciscoasa>enablc 
Ciscoasa#config t 
To start with, clear all previous object configuration and nat configuration. 
Ciscoasa(config)#clear configure object 
Ciscoasa( config)#clear configure nat 
Now start the configuration 
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SRV l 
Ciscoasa(config)#host 192.168. 1 . 10 
Ciscoasa(config)#nat (dmz,outside) static 209. 165.200.22 
Ciscoasa( config)#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#policy-map type inspect http HTTP-POLICY 
Ciscoasa( config-pmap )#parameters 
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-p)#protocol-violation action drop-connection log 
Now, create a new traffic class inside the global-policy with the following parameters 
Traffic class name: WEB-PROTECTION 
Traffic Matching: From the ANY to the DMZ Server 
Apply the configured HTTP-Policy HTTP inspection policy-map 
Ciscoasa(config)#object network DMZ-SERVER-PRIV 
Ciscoasa( cisco )#host 192.168. 1 . 1 0  
Ciscoasa( config)#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#access-list GLOBAL-DMZ extended permit tcp any object DMZ-SERVER­
PRIV eq www 
Ciscoasa( config)#class-map WEB-PROTECTION 
Ciscoasa(config)#rnatch access-list GLOBAL-DMZ 
Ciscoasa( config)#pol icy-map global_pol icy 
Ciscoasa( config-pmap )#class WEB-PROTECTION 
Ciscoasa(config-pmap-c)#inspect http HTTP-POLICY 
In order to check the policy type 
ciscoasa# sh service-policy global 
The following figure should be seen 
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Testing and Verification 
From the outside erver access the web page of the DMZ server through a web browser, we can 
see below that the attempt is successful: Based on the NAT configuration, we can access the 
DMZ server from outside network using 209.165.200.22 which will be translated to 
192.168.1.10. 
XAMPP Apache + MariaDB + p 
Welcome to XAMPP for Windows 7.2 3 
Now open putty in the outside server and access the DMZ server 209. 165.200.22 with telnet 
using a port 80: This will be dropped becau e it's a bad http traffic, we are trying to to telnet 
using http protocol port 110:80 
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LAB : ACCESS-LIST ACL USING NETWORK OBJECT 
Lab Purpose: The purpose of this lab is to learn how to use network object to group access-list 
entries for easy configuration for traffic filtering. 
Notes: 
11172.16.1.2 
lill 172.16.3.4 11 172.165.6 
-"1-
0UTSIDE w lNSIOE 
·--·,�J ---
< /:--_ _____, �TTP ONS ICMP 
10.3.0.0116 
A set of interface access rules can cause the Cisco ASA to permit or deny a designated host to 
access another particular host with a specific network application (service). When there is only 
one client, one host and one service, you need only a minimum number of lines in an interface 
rule set. However, as the number of clients, servers, and services increases, the number of rules 
that you need for each individual access type can increase and become unmanageable. 
A better approach is to introduce object grouping. This solution allows you to arbitrarily group 
hosts, resources, or services that share the same policy, which optimizes the access rules. 
In our scenario above, the ASA control traffic between an internal enterprise network that is 
connected over the inside interface and an external network that is connected over the outside 
interface. 
The internal subnet 10.3.0.0/16 and the internal client 10. 1 . 1 .2 should both have permanent 
HTTP, FfP, DNS and ICMP access to a group of external servers ( 172. 1 6. 1 .2, 172. 16.3.4 and 
172 . 16.5.6) 
Task 1 :  Create a network object for the network 10.3.0.0/16 and the host 10. 1 . 1 .2: 
Solution 
Ciscoasa>enable 
Ciscoasa#config t 
Ciscoasa(config)#object network NETWORK-CLIENT 
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#subnet 10.3.0.0 255.255.255.0 
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Ciscoasa( con fig-obj-network )#exit 
Ciscoasa( config)#object network PC-CLIENT 
Ciscoasa( config-obj-network)#host 10. 1 . 1 .2 
Task 2: Create a network object for the external servers: 
Ciscoasa( config-ob j-net work)#exit 
Ciscoasa(config)#object network SERVERS-A 
Ciscoasa(config-obj-network)#host 172 . 16. 1 .2 
Ciscoasa( config-ob j-network)#exit 
Ciscoasa( config)#object network SER VERS-B 
Ciscoasa( config-obj-network)#host 172.16.3 .4 
Ciscoasa( config-obj-network)#exit 
Ciscoasa( config)#object network SERVERS-C 
Ciscoasa( config-obj-network)#host 172.16.5.6 
Ciscoasa( config-ob j-net work)#exit 
Task 3 :  Creates a network object group for the clients (Grouping the clients) 
Ciscoasa(config)#object-group network INTERNAL 
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object NETWORK-CLIENT 
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object PC-CLIENT 
Task 4: Create a network object group for the servers: 
Ciscoasa( config)#object-group network EXTERNAL-SERVERS 
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object SERVERS-A 
Ciscoasa(config)#network-object object SERVERS-B 
Ciscoasa( config)#network-object object SER VERS-C 
Task 5: Creates a service object group: 
Ciscoasa(config)#object-group service CLIENT-SERVICES 
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object icmp echo 
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object tcp destination eq ftp 
Ciscoasa(config)#servicc-object tcp destination eq http 
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object udp destination eq domain 
Ciscoasa(config)#service-object tcp destination eq domain 
Task 6: Configure an ACL that uses network and service object groups: 
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Ciscoasa(config)#access-list INSIDE-ACL extended permit object-group CLIENT-SERVICES 
object-group INTERNAL Object-group EXTERNAL-SERVERS 
Task 7: Apply the ACL inbound of the inside interface: 
Ciscoasa( config)#int gigO/l 
Ciscoasa(config-if)#access-group INSIDE-ACL in interface inside 
Task 8: Test the policy by typing Ciscoa a(config) #sh run object-group 
ciscoasaf. show run object-group 
object-group network INTERNAL 
network-object object NETWORK-CLIENT 
network-object object PC-CLIENT 
object -group network EXTERNAL - S E RVERS 
ne two rk- ob j ect o b j e c t  SERVER-A 
network-obj e c t  ob j e ct SERVER-B 
network-object obj ect SERVER-C 
object-group service CLIENT-SERVICES 
service-object icmp echo 
service-object tcp destination eq ftp 
service-object tcp destination eq www 
service-object udp destination eq domain 
ciscoasa# 
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PALO AL TO FIREWALL LAB PRACTICES 
LAB 1 :  PALO ALTO INITIAL WEB ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 
In this lab you will: 
• Connect to the firewall through the MGT interface 
• Create new administrator roles and accounts on the firewall 
·-
. . - . '\ 
n palo ,g �-----------� 
-
MGT 
192.168.1 .1 
1 92.168. 1 . 1 00/24 
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Task 1 :  The Palo Alto firewall is recently acquired firewall, the management interface typically 
comes with a default IP address 192.168. 1 . 1/24. Configure your computer in the IP address range 
of the MGT port of the device to have access to the web interface with a default 
usemame/password of admin/admin. 
Solution 
Configure the physical Ethernet interface of your laptop with an IP address on 
the same subnet as the MGf port of your firewall. (i.e. TCP/IP settings of the 
NIC card) 
If your firewall is at default configuration, the IP address of the MGT port is 
192.168.1 . 1 124. Give your laptop Ethernet port an address of 192. 168.1. 100/24. 
If your firewall is not at default configuration, give your laptop an IP address on the same 
subnet as the MGT port IP address. 
Connect an Ethernet cable between your laptop Ethernet port and the MGT port 
of your firewall. 
Open a command prompt on your laptop and verify you can ping the MGT port 
IP address. 
Disable any other active interfaces on your laptop, including the wireless interface, so the 
Ethernet port connected to the firewall is your only active port. 
Access the management fP address of the firewall on a web browser 
https:// 1 92 . 168. 1 .  l (or the default IP address assigned to the Firewall) 
Type in the username/password as admin/admin. A warning about the default admin 
credentials appears. 
Click OK to dismiss the warning for now. The PAN firewall GUI appears. 
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Task 2: Change the password of the admin account to EIULAB to disable the warnings about using 
default credentials. 
Solution 
On the WEB UI of the firewall, Click Device> Administrators 
Click ad min in the list of users. Change the password from admin to EIU LAB. Click OK 
to close the configuration window. (leave the SSH PKA uncheck) 
Task 3 :  Create a role for an assi tant administrator which will allow access to all firewall 
functionality through the WEBUI except Monitor, Network, Privacy, and Device. Create an 
account using this role. 
Solution 
Click Device> Adm in Roles.(in the left pane) 
Click Add in the lower left of the panel and create a new admin role: 
Type Policy Admins in the name window 
Web UI tab categories Click the following major categories to disable them: 
• Monitor 
• Network 
• Device 
• Privacy 
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The remaining major categories should remain enabled. 
Click OK to continue. 
Task 4: Create a general account 
Click Device> Administrators. 
CJ ick Add in the lower left comer of the panel. Configure a new administrator account: 
Name field Type ip-admin 
Password/Confinn Password Type paloalto 
Role Select Role Based 
Profile Select Policy Admin (scroll down menu) 
SSH Leave it uncheck 
Click OK 
To save your configuration, click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click 
OK to the commit pop- up window and wait until the commit process completes, then click 
Close. 
LAB 2: Layer 3 Configuration 
In this lab you will: 
• Create Interface Management Profiles 
• Configure Ethernet interfaces with Layer 3 information 
• Configure DHCP 
virtual router 
e1/3 
�[II] 
Task 1 :  Create new Security Zones 
Create two zones, Untiust-L3 and Trust-L3, interface e l/3 should be assigned to the Untrust-L3 
zone, while interface el/4 should be assigned to the Tiust-L3 zone. 
1 .  Go to the WEBUI and click the Network tab >  Zones (in the left pane) 
2. Click Add and create the Untrust-L3 zone: 
Name type Untrust-L3 
Type Verify that Layer 3 is selected 
Click OK lo close the zone creation window. 
3. Click Add and create the Trust-L3 zone: 
Name type Tiust-L3 
Type Verify that Layer 3 is selected 
Click OK to close the zone creation window. 
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Task 2: Create Interface Management Profiles 
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Device 
ln�rfaas I Vrb.Jal Systems 
ethemetl/2 
ethmlett/l 
etheme'l/3 
e!hemetl/4 
Configure the interface in Untrust-L3 to be able to respond to pings and the interface in Trust-L3 to 
be able to provide al I management services. 
The Interface in the Untrust zone should be a DHCP client, while interface in the Trust zone 
should have a static IP address 192.168.2.1/24 
Solution 
4. Click Network > Network Profiles > Interface Mgmt 
5. Click Add and create an interface management profile as follows: 
Name column Type allow _all 
Permitted Services Check all boxes 
Permitted IP Addresses Do not add any addresses 
Click OK to close the Interface Management Profile 
6. Click Add and create another interface management profile: 
Zon1 
Interface T)l:e Select from draw dowrmenu Layer 3 
Config tab 
Virtual Router Keep default (none) 
Security Zone Select Untrust-L3 
[Pv4 tab 
DHCP Client Select DHCP Client 
Advanced tab > Other Info tab 
Management Profile Select allow _ping 
Name column type allow_ping 
Permitted Services check only the Ping check box 
Permitted IP Addresses Do not add any addresses 
Click OK to close the interface management profile creation window. 
7. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait 
until the commit process completes before continuing. 
Task 3 :  Configure Ethernet interfaces with Layer 3 info 
8. Click the Network tab >  Interfaces > Ethernet tab 
9. Click the interface name ethernetl/3. Configure the interface: 
Note: Do check any other box if not instructed to do so 
Click OK to close the interface configuration window. 
10. Click the interface name ethemet 1/4. Configure the interface: 
Interface Type Select Layer 3 
Configtab 
Virtual Router Keep default (none) 
Security Zone Select Trust-L3 
1Pv4 tab 
Tvoe Keep default (Static) 
IP Click Add then type 192. 168.2.1124 
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Advanced > Other Info 
Management Profile Select allow _all 
Click OK to close the intetface configuration window. 
You should see both intetfaces on green as shown in the next figure, if the 
interfaces are not 
Green call your instructor 
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The Trust-L3 zone will be where the internal clients connect to the firewall and so the interface 
in Trust-L3 will provide DHCP addresses to these internal clients. The DHCP server you 
configure in the Trust-L3 zone will inherit DNS settings from the external facing intetface. 
Solution 
1 1 . Click the Network tab >  DHCP > DHCP Server. 
12 .  Click Add to define a new DHCP Server: 
Interface Name Select ethernet l/4 
Inheritance Source Select ethernetl/3 
Gateway Enter 192.168.2.1 
Primary DNS Select inherited 
IP Pools Click Add then enter 192. 168.2.50- L 92. 168.2.60 
Click OK to close the DHCP Server configuration window. 
Testing the DHCP Server configuration 
13 .  Connect a laptop to e l/4 and make sure the laptop NIC setting is set to DHCP. 
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Please note, your laptop will not get an IP address until you complete Laboratory 
LAB 3 :  Virtual Router and NAT Configuration 
In this lab you will: 
• Create a Virtual Router 
• Create Source NAT policy 
• Create a pair of simple Security Policies 
.. 
.. 
Task 1 :  Create a Virtual Router 
virtual router 
e1/3�� 
89 
Configure a virtual router on the firewall so that the internal and external interfaces on the firewall 
must route traffic through the external-facing interface by default 
Solution 
1 .  Click the Network tab > Virtual Routers (in the left pane) 
2. Click Add to define a new virtual router: 
I General tab I 1-. __ N_a_m_e--------1 type Student-YR 
Interfaces pane Click Add then select ethemet l/3 
Click Add again and select ethernet l/4 
Remember: Do not select or type in boxes you have nol inslructed Lo do so 
Click OK to close the virtuaJ router configuration window. 
3. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait 
until the commit process completes before continuing. 
Task 2: Create a Source NAT policy 
Configure a NAT policy so that all traffic originating in the Trust-L3 zone appears to 
come from the external-facing address of the firewall. 
Solution 
4. Click the Policies tab >  NAT (on the left pane) 
5. Click Add to define a new source NAT policy: 
General tab 
Name Type Student_Source_NA T 
Original Packet tab 
Source Zone pane Click Add and select Trust-L3 
Destination Zone Select Untrust-L3 
Destination Interface Select ethemetl/3 
Translated Packet > Source 
Address Translation tab 
Translation Type Select Dynamic IP and Port 
Address Type Select Interface Address 
Interface Select ethemet l/3 
Click OK to close the NAT policy configuration window. 
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6. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait 
until the commit process completes before continuing. 
You will still not be able to access the Internet from your PC. The final task will 
be to create the Security Policies to allow traffic to flow from the Trust-L3 to 
the Untrust-L3 zone 
Task 3: Create Security Policie 
7. Click the Policies Tab > Security (left pane) 
8. Delete any configure rule (Highlight the policy (i.e. click) and then click 
"delete" 
9. Click Add to define a new security policy 
Give it a Name: Internet-Security-Rule 
Source > Click Add > Trust-L3 
Destination > Click Add > Untrust-L3 
Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEB U L  Click OK again and wait until the 
commit process completes before continuing. 
Task 5: Check that you are able to connect to the internet from your computer or the 
LAPTOP connect to the Palo AJto firewall 
LAB 4: APP-ID 
In this lab you will: 
• Create a security policy to allow basic intemet connectivity and log dropped traffic 
• Enable Application Block pages 
• Create Application Filters and Application Groups 
Task 1 :  Create the Allow All Out Policy 
At this point, the firewall is configured with the basics (i.e. IP addresses in interfaces) but. is  
not able to pass traffic. Security policies must be defined before traffic will flow between 
zones. Configure a Policy to allow all outbound traffic, and to block and log any incoming traffic. 
This will allow employees to surf the Internet, and will allow the firewall to log which applications 
they have used. 
Solution 
1 .  Go to the WebUI and click Policies > Security (Top of left pane) 
2. Delete any existing security policy.(click on the policy and then click delete at the 
bottom) 
3. Click Add to define a security policy: 
General tab 
Name Type Allow_All_Out 
Source tab 
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S ource Zone Click Add a nd select Trust -L3 
S ource Address Select A ny 
Destina tion tab 
Des tination Zone Click Add a nd select Untru st-L3 
Desti nati on Address Select A ny 
A pplication tab 
Applications Select A ny 
Service/URL Category tab 
Service Selec t A ny fr om the pull-dow n 
Actions tab 
Action Setting Selec t Allow 
Log Setting Selec t Log at Se ssi on E nd 
4. C lick OK t o  cl ose the security policy c onfi gura tion window. 
Create a Deny a nd Log I nb ou nd Policy 
5. Click Add to define the Deny Inbou nd security policy: 
Ge neral tab 
Name Tvoe De ny and Log I nbound 
S ource tab 
S ource Zone Click Add and selec t Untrust-L3 
S ource Addre ss Select A ny 
Destination tab 
Destination Zone Click Add a nd select T rust -L3 
Destination Address Select A ny 
Applica tion tab 
Applications Check the A ny b ox 
Service/URL Category tab 
Service Selec t A ny from the pull-down 
Acti ons tab 
Action Setting Selec t Deny 
Log Sett ing Selec t Log at Se ssi on End 
6. Click OK to cl ose the security p olicy c onfiguration wind ow. 
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7. Make sure that the Allow All Out is above the Deny and Log Inbound policy in the list of 
Security 
Policies. 
If the Allow All out policy is not above the Deny and Log Inbound policy 
Click to Highlight the policy, then click from the drop down menu, select Move and 
from there be sure to move the policy above or below 
8. Before testing be sure the configuration looks like the following figure 
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8. Test internet connectivity by browsing websites from your laptop. You should be able to 
surf the Web on http and https sites. 
9. Connect to the sitefacebookcom 
10. Connect to the site box.net 
11. Go to Monitor> Logs > Traffic to see a record of your Internet browsing. Especially 
notice the Application column. 
Task 2: Create an Application Group 
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Create a General Internet policy to restrict users to a set of commonly used applications ( dns, 
fileserve, flash, ftp, paloalto-updates, ping, web-browsing, ssl). The applications should only be 
permitted on application default ports. All other traffic (inbound and outbound) should be blocked 
and logged. Configure the firewall to notify users when blocked applications are used so that the 
help desk does not get called for "connection issues" that arc actually blocked applications. 
Solution 
1 .  Click Objects > Application Groups.( on the left pane) 
2. er k Add d r th K IC to e me e nown-
Name 
Applications 
G d r 00 app 1cat1on group: 
Type Known-Good 
Click Add and select each of the following: 
• dns 
• fileserve 
• flash 
• ftp 
• paloalto-updates 
Click OK to close the application group configuration window. 
In order to Disable the Allow All Out Policy go to Policies > Security 
3. Select the Allow All Out Policy and click Disable. 
Create the General Internet Policy 
4. Go to the WEBUI and click Policies > Security. 
5. Click Add to define a security policy: 
General tab 
Name Type General Internet 
Source tab 
Source Zone Click Add and elect Trust-L3 
Source Address Select Any 
Destination tab 
Destination Zone Click Add and select Untrnst-L3 
-
Destination Address Select Anv 
Application tab 
Applications Click Add and select the Known-Good Application 
Service/URL Category tab 
Service Select annlication-default from the oull-down 
Actions tab 
Action Settine Select Allow 
Log Setting Select Lo!! at Session End 
Click OK to close the security policy configuration window. 
Create Policies to Deny and Log All Outbound Traffic 
6. Click Policies > Security. 
7. Cl. k Add d fi h D IC to e me t e 
General tab 
Name 
Source tab 
Source Zone 
Source Address 
Destination tab 
Destination Zone 
Destination Address 
Application tab 
Applications 
enyan 
Service/URL Category tab 
Service 
Actions tab 
Action Setting 
Log Setting 
d Lo 0 b d 1g ut oun security po icy: 
Type Denv and Log Outbound 
Click Add and select Trust-L3 
Select Any 
Click Add and select Untrust-L3 
Select Any 
Check the Any box 
Select any from the pull-down 
Select Deny 
Select Log at Session End 
Click OK to close the security policy configuration window. 
8. Rearrange the Security Policies in the following order: 
Click to Highlight the policy, then click from the drop down menu. select Move and 
from there be sure to move the policy above or below 
a. General Internet 
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b. Deny and 
Log 
Outbound c. 
Deny and 
Log Inbound 
Make sure any other Security Policies are disabled. 
9. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait until 
the commit process completes before continuing. 
Verify Internet Connectivity and Application Blocking 
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10. Test internet connectivity by browsing websites from your laptop. Does web surfing over 
ports 80 and 
443 work? You may notice some difficulty reaching sites that you were able to 
reach before you implemented a stricter Security Policy. 
1 1 .  Attempt to browse to Facebook. The browser should not be able to display the site. 
12. Use a browser to connect to the site http://www.box.net. The browser should not be able 
to get to the display site. 
1 3 .  Go to Monitor > Logs > Traffic to review the traffic logs to determine why this site is not 
reachable. 
You can see that the boxnet-base andfacebook-base applications are not allowed by the 
configured policies. 
14. Attempt to reach the site http://www.box.net using the proxy site 
http://www.avoidr.com. The site fails to load. 
15. Check the traffic logs again and you will find that the application phproxy has been 
blocked. This is why the avoidr site failed. 
Enable the Application Block Page 
16. Retum to the WEBU1 and click Device > Response Pages. 
17 .  Find the Application Block Page hne and click Disabled. 
18. Check the Enable Application Block Page box, and then click OK. 
19. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again and wait 
until the commit process completes before continuing. 
20. Open a browser window and go to http://wwwjacebook.com. This time you see an 
Application Block Page explaining why the site was blocked. 
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LAB 5: APP-ID LAB II  
In this lab you will: (this will enhance and continue the work of Lab 4) 
• Create a security policy to allow basic internet connectivity and log dropped traffic 
• Create Application Filters and Application Groups 
Trust-L3 
Task I :  The results from Lab 4 tasks testing, resulted in the following discoverie : 
The logs from task 1 show heavy use of a variety of internet proxies and web-based file 
sharing services by users. Create a Deny list explicitly preventing the use of these 
applications. 
The rules blocking all unmatched traffic were too restrictive for your environment. The testing, 
denied access to numerous vital applications, causing a surge in support calls. Any traffic which 
does not match the Deny list should be allowed but logged for future policy decision. 
The following table shows a summary of the task we will accomplish in this lab 
Application Filter names Proxies 
Web-Based-File-Sharing 
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Security Policy names Block-Known-Bad 
Allow and Log Outbound 
Setting for Proxies application filter Subcategory: Proxies 
Settings for Web-Based-File- Subcategory: file-sharing 
Sharing application filter 
Technology: browser-based 
Members of the Known-Bad Proxies 
application group 
Web-Based-
File- Sharing 
Solution: 
Disable previous Security Policies 
1 .  Click the Deny and Log Outbound rule and click the Disable button 
2. Click the General Internet rule and click Disable button. 
Create Application Filters and Groups 
3. Go to the WEBUI and click Objects > Application Filters. 
4. Click Add to define the Proxies a lication filter: 
Name 
Subcate o column 
Click OK to close the application filter 
configuration window. 
5.  Click Add to define the Web-Based-File-Shru.ing 
a lication filter: 
Name T e Web-Based-File-Sharin 
Select file-sharin 
Select browser-based 
Click OK to close the application filter configuration window. 
6. Click Objects > Application Groups 
100 
.. 
7. Click Add to define the Known-Badapplication group 
Name : Type Known-Bad 
Applications: Click Add and select f r o m  t h e  d r o p  d o w n  m e n u  each of the 
following: 
• Proxies 
• Web-Based-File-Sharing 
Click OK to close the application group configuration window. 
Update Securi�y Policies 
8. Click Policies > Security. 
9. er k Add d fi th Bl k Kn lC to e me e oc - own-B d a r secuntv po 1cv: 
General tab 
Name Tvne Block-Known-Bad 
Source tab 
Source Zone rljr'k Arlrl and <u�IP.('� Tni�t-1 .1 
Source Address Select Anv 
Destination tab 
Destini:itinn Zone Click Add and select Untrust -L3 
Destination Address Select Anv 
Aoolication tab 
Annlications Click Add and select Known-Bad 
Service/URL Cate2orv tab 
Service Select anv from the null-down 
Actions tab 
Action Settin2 Select Denv 
Lo2 Settine: Select Loe. at Session End 
Click OK to close the security policy configuration window. 
10. Add the Allow and Log Outbound Security Policy with the following values 
General tab 
Name Type Allow and Log Outbound 
Source tab 
Source Zone Click Add and select Trust-L3 
1 0 1  
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Source Address Select Any 
Destination tab 
Destination Zone Click Add and select Untrust-L3 
Destination Address Select Any 
Application tab 
Applications Check the Any box 
Service/URL Category tab 
Service Select any from the pull-down 
Actions tab 
Action Setting Select Allow 
Log Setting Select Log at Session End 
Click OK to close the security policy configuration window. 
1 1 .  Use the Move buttons at the bottom of the page to arrange the policies in a logical 
order. You can also rearrange the rule by clicking and dragging them into the correct 
order. Confirm that your security list looks like this (order) 
• Block-Known-Bad 
• Allow-and-Log-AU-Out 
• Deny-and-Log-Inbound 
Make sure any other policies are disabled 
12. Click the Commit link at the top-right of the WEBUI. Click OK again  and wait until the 
commit process completes before continuing. 
Verify Internet Connectivity and Application Blocking 
13 .  Confirm that you can surf the Internet, except for being blocked from web-based file-
sharing sites like avoidr.com 
14. Confirm that you cannot reach file-sharing sites using avoidr.com 
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15. Click the ACC tab to access the Application Command Center. Use the drop-down 
menu in the application section of the ACC to select different ways of viewing the 
traffic that you have generated. 
16. Click on one of the Applications to get more information. A detailed view appears. 
17.  Click the x in the box in the upper right hand corner to close the detailed view. 
